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Social Security and Household Portfolio Allocation
ABSTRACT
The entitlement to social security retirement benefits is a major component
of aggregate household wealth. This paper focuses on the impact of social
security annuities on household portfolio allocation, extending existing
optimizing models of portfolio allocation to explicitly consider the role of
social security. The model is implemented using cross—section data. The
partial equilibrium impacts of changes in social security benefits on portfolio
choice and composition are small but precisely measured. The general equilib-
rium impacts on asset markets of a social security policy change (focusing on
links between social security and dynamic wealth accumulation and between social
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The entitlement to social security retirement benefits is a major
component of aggregate household wealth in the U. S. This paper focuses on
the impact of "social security annuities" on household portfolio allocation
and exposes the ways in which optimizing agents deal with exogenous changes
in government retirement saving policies. Considering the effect of the
social security system on portfolio choice and composition is an important
step toward understanding the system's impact on savings.
The entitlement to social security benefits In retirement is a type of
annuity. Taxes are collected during an individual's working life, and
benefits are paid in retirement until death. That this annuity scheme can
affect household non—pension saving has been the subject of much research
over the past decade. Through its characteristics as an asset, social
security can also affect the allocation of non—pension wealth.
Most studies of the impacts of social security on individual wealth
accumulation have concentrated on the response of household consumption to
changes in social security that generate an increase in lifetime resources
(i.e., under the assumption that the present value of anticipated benefits
exceeds the present value of contributions).' Empirical tests of the
impact of social security on individual (or household) saving have been
undertaken by Feldstein [11,12], Kotlikoff [21], Leimer and Lesnoy [23],
Barro [2], Feldstein and Pellechio [13], Blinder, Grodon, and Wise [3],
King and Dicks—Mireaux [20], and Diamond and Hausman [6]. The time—series
evidence has been mixed and inconclusive. Microeconomic (cross—section)
evidence has generally supported the proposition that social security
reduces individual saving, though empirical estimates are again varied.—2—
Participation in the social security system is not a choice variable
for most individuals. In addition to the changes in the intertemporal
consumption decision induced by changes in manadatory social security
holdings, there is significant potential for a reallocation of non—pension
wealth. Two principal characteristics of the social security annuity
describe its influence on household portfolio allocation:
(1) nonmarketability of anticipated benefits2, and (ii) integration with
private pension benefits.3
The paper extends and tests existing optimizing models of portfolio
allocation to explicitly consider the role of social security. Section I
contains the theoretical framework which serves as the basis for the
analysis. Using a cross—section of household data for the U. S., the
impact of the social security system on household portfolio allocation is
tested in Section II. Section III extends those results by considering the
general equilibrium impacts on asset markets of a social security policy
change, specifically focusing on links between social security and dynamic
wealth accumulation and between social security benefits and private
pension benefits. Section IV summarizes the main findings and implications
and points toward directions for future research.
I. SOCIAL SECURITY AND WEALTH ALLOCATION: AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Toquantify and estimate the impact of social security on the
allocation of household wealth, we need a basic approach to modeling
portfolio allocation. Beginning with the methodology suggested by Merton
[25,26,281 and Samuelson [31] and elaborated in a different context by
Roley [30] and Friedman and Roley [15], relative asset shares in total
wealth will depend on relative rates of return according to the variance——3—
covariance structure of asset returns.4 The analysis which follows hasits
origins in the work of Mayers [241 on the portfolio impacts of
nonmarketable assets and in the work of Friedman and Roley [15] on optimal
portfolio allocation. The basic modeling approaching of Friedman and Roley
is modified to explicitly consider social security.
Abstracting from social security, the general problem of choosing
optimal portfolio selection arid composition rules can be derived from the
maximization of the present discounted value of utility derived from
consumption, subject to a wealth constraint. The utility function is
assumed to be strictly concave, and the assumption of constant relative
risk aversion is maintained throughout. Let
C =consumption
W total marketable wealth (exclusive of pension annuities)
SSW present value of anticipated social security benefits
p coefficient of constant relative risk aversion
r =realnet return on the i' asset
=variance—covariancematrix of asset returns
6 =individualdiscount rate
=shareof W held in the th asset.
:i
Assume that there are no assets provided by the market with risk—free
real returns. An examination of real returns over the past decade reveals
that this assumption is not so strong as it seems. Even the research on
the hedging quality of short—term Treasury bills by Fama and Schwert [8]
and by Bodie [51 has shown only that bills are hedges against anticipated
inflation. Social security retirement annuities are also not riskiess.—4—
Prior to the formal indexation benefits in 1972 and to some extent
today, there are lags in adjusting benefits for inflation. Second, shocks
to the economy which affect the growth rate of labor income can alter the
real return on social security. Finally, social security benefits may be
increased in discrete jumps, increasing the rate of return on taxes paid
for some cohorts.
In the absence of a risk—free asset, following Merton [26,28], the
problem of choosing optimal portfolio selection and composition rules is
formulated in continuous time as
max E[J et U[C(t)]dt +B(w(T),T)], (1)
subject to the budget constraint that
dW a'r W dt —Cdt+a'W. (2)
B(W(T),T) is a "bequest valuation function," which is assumed to be concave
in W(T). E denotes the expectation operator.
To derive the optimality equations, the problem can be restated in
dynamic programming form as
J(W(t),t) =max E(t)[fTe5 U(C(s))ds +B(W(T),T)J, (3)
{C(s),ct(s)} 0
subject to the same constraints as before. In general, (3) can be
expressed as
J(W(t0),t0) = max E(t)[J eU[C(s)]ds +J(W(t),t)]. (4)
{C(s),a(s)} 0—5—
Letting t =to+ h and performing a Taylor expansion about W(t0) yields:
J(W(t0), t0)maxfCn}E(tO){e_6tU[C(t] + J(W(t0), t0)












we can formulate the maximization subject to the constraint that the asset
shares must sum to unity. That is,
L =0 +A(1 —a'l), (8)
where X is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint. The
first—order conditions associated with (8) are
L =0=etU(C(t)) —J, (9a)
L =0=—A+ + Jc2c'W2,and (9b)—6—
Lx =0 1 —ct'l. (9c)
The first condition is familiar; it equates the (discounted) marginal
utility of consumption with the marginal utility of wealth. Combining (9b)
and (9c) and using the fact that under the assumption of constant relative
risk aversion p =—W(J/Jw),we obtain the vector of desired asset shares
*
= - [Air+B, (10)
where
A —(l'c11)1c111' Q', and (ha)
—1 —i —1 B =(1'1) c21. (lIb)
Given a mandatory nonmarketable position in social security annuities
of amount SSW, equation (10) is modified to
* 1[A](r — + B, (12)
where a caret indicates the inclusion of only the marketable (i.e., non-
social security) assets. is the vector of covariances of the returns
on the marketable assets with that of social security.
The larger is the ratio of an individual's social security wealth to
his non—pension (marketable) wealth, the lower will his demand be for other
assets whose returns are positively correlated with that of social
security. Thinking of (rk — Sskas the "adjusted return" on asset—7—
k, the effect of a change in social security on adjusted returns and the
composition of non—pension wealth depends on:(i) the individual's risk
aversion, (ii) mandatory social security holdings relative to non—pension
wealth, and (iii) the correlation of the expected return with that of
social security.
The intuition here is clear. Given that participation in the social
security annuity system is involuntary and given that the entitlement to
benefits is not marketable, we can examine the effect of social security on
the allocation of fungibie wealth. Expressing required social security
holdings SSW as the sum of an optimal amount SSW (the individual's choice
in an unconstrained optimization) plus the excess of required over desired
social security, for any asset k,
* *
1 ssw ssw —ssw ak =ar
—
Wa cSSJ
+ )a °SSj÷ bk, (13)
where akJ are the elements in the kth row of [A] and bk is the kth element
of the vector B. The higher the desired level of social security wealth,
the lower will be the relative demand for asset k (as long asakSS > 0).
However, to the extent that there is too little (too much) SSW, the
relative demand for asset k is Increased (decreased) whenakSS > 0.
The next two sections focus on estimating the model of household
portfolio allocation in the presence of pensions and on combining the
results with information about the Impact of pensions on household saving
to simulate the general equilibrium impacts on portfolio allocation of a
change In social security benefits relative to non—pension wealth.—8—
II.ESTIMATING ThE IMPACTOFSOCIAL SECURITY ON HOUSEHOLD
WEALTHALLOCATION
A. Background
Muchof the previous work on the effects of social security on saving
has used aggregate time—series data. "Representative transactor" models
are not likely to be good analytical tools for examining the portfolio
composition effects. The nonmarketability of anticipated social security
benefits makes "high—income" and "low—income" individuals quite
different. Because social security benefits are not proportional to pre—
retirement earnings, high—income individuals should have much lower
measures of SSW/W than low—income individuals. A macroeconomic—level
SSW 6
regression using an aggregate —i--wouldobscure this difference.
Hence, cross—section data are required to properly implement the
model. The household data used in this paper are excerpted from surveys
done in 1979 and 1980 under the auspices of the U. S. President's
Commission on Pension Policy. Those data represent one of the few attempts
since Federal Reserve Board's 1962 survey of consumers (described in
Projector and Weiss [29]) to devise an asset data base on the household
level. The bulk of the data base comes from two interviews, one year
apart. The Wave I interview was conducted in September 1979, and the Wave
II interview was conducted in September 1980. Only data from the first
wave are used in estimating the model.
B. The Model andEstimation Results
Inkeeping with the derivation of the optimal portfolio allocation,
the basic model to be estimated is of the form:—9—
ssw ppw
c. f(T, —a—-,——- (14)
where jindexesassets; T is the unit's marginal tax rate; W, SSJ, and PPW
represent non—pension wealth and the present values of anticipated social
security and private pension benefits, respectively; andis a vector of
other explanatory variables. The logistic transformation of (14) is
actually estimated, to reduce heteroscedasticity,7 i.e.,
' icz) + T + + (PPW) + (15)
The present values of anticipated social security benefits and private
pension benefits are entered separately In (15), so that they are not
constrained to have the same Impact on portfolio allocation.
Values for r are obtained from the TAXSIM model of the National
Bureau of Economic Research, given data on earned income, income from
assets, and family characteristics.8 Non—pension wealth W represents the
net worth of the unit. The gross asset position Is obtained by summing the
values of the holdings of the individual assets (financial and
nonfinancial). Total liabilities include mortgage and consumer
indebtedness. Net worth is just the difference between gross wealth and
total liabilities. Details on the construction of household gross social
security wealth and private pension wealth variables can be found in the
Appendix.
The elements of P,the"other explanatory variables," can be divided
into two parts. The first category contains "portfolio scale" variables,
the ratio of net worth to permanent income and (the log of) permanent
income. Details on the construction of the permanent income variable can— 10—
befound in the Appendix. These wealth and income variables act as proxies
for effects of the size of the total portfolio on portfolio allocation
(such as transactions costs). In the second category are relevant
individual characteristics, such as self—employment status, labor force
status (whether the head of the household is employed), number of children
under eighteen years of age, whether the unit is a farm family, and age.9
There are three brackets for age —underforty (AGEI), between forty and
fifty—five (AGE2), and over fifty—five (AGE3).
The following assets were considered: market value of the home, U. S.
savings bonds, deposits, non—pension annuities, bonds, equities, and
passenger cars." In addition, total liabilities (sum of mortgage and
consumer indebtedness) were analyzed in the same framework. The inclusion
of liabilities provides another test of the impact of the nonmarketability
cnstraints embodied in social security annuities.
Since the model in (1.5) considers only those observations with positive
holdings of the asset, it will be necessary to correct for sample selection
bias. Using the procedure suggested by Heckman [18], a first—stage probit
model for the probability of owning a given asset was estimated for the
full sample. The probit model (for the discrete choice to hold each asset)
included as explanatory variables the ratios of non—pension wealth, private
pension wealth, and social security wealth to permanent income, (the log
of) permanent income, the marginal tax rate, and dummy variables for
whether the head of the unit is under age forty, for low current unit
earnings (less than $6000), and for whether the head of the household has
at least a high school education. The inverse of Mill's ratio (from the
estimated probit equations) was added as an additional regressor in (14) to
correct for sample selection bias)° Results of the first—stage probit— 11—
modelsfor positive asset holdings can be found in Table I. The number of
observations in the sample with sufficient information to construct the
permanent income and pension wealth variables is 3084.
From Table I, it is clear that the marginal tax rate plays an
important role in the discrete choice of which assets to hold. For
example, the influence of the marginal tax rate on the decision to buy a
house or to buysharesof stock Is particularly great. The evidence in
Table I makes apparent the need to consider the impact of taxationon
portfolio choice as well as on portfolio composition.
For each asset, the probability of ownership rises with the ratio of
non—pension wealth to permanent income. It is not obvious a priori what
effects on the probability of holding the various assets we shouldexpect
of the other two components of wealth. As anticipated social security and
private pension benefits are long—term illiquid assets, they might be
expected to lessen the chances of holding assets with similar
characteristics. However, not all illiquid assets may be perceived aspart
of saving for retirement (e.g., cars), while liquid assets such as equities
might be. The ratios of the present values of private pension benefits and
social security benefits to permanent income generally exert a positive
impact on the holdings of the marketable assets. Those effects are
significant for savings bonds, equities, and passenger cars in the case of
private pensions, and for housing annuities, passenger cars, and
liabilities in the case of social security. Social security exerted a
positive influence in each of those cases except annuities.— 12—
TABLEI
Probit Model For Positive Asset Holdings
Value of Savings Passenger
Home Bonds Deposits Bonds EquityAnnuitiesCars Debt
Constant —7.478 —2.8742.393 —7.351 —8.387 —3.797 —3.067—5.434
(0.153) (0.191) (0.595)(2.437) (1.497) (1.935)(1.353) (1.162)
*
PPW/Y —0.0140.0170.009 0.005 0.043 0.002 0.082—0.001
(0.009) (0.008) (0.013)(0.012) (0.020) (0.013)(0.036) (0.099)
*
SSWIY 0.079 —0.0040.012 0.048—0.006 —0.011 0.054 0.043
(0.022) (0.019) (0.080)(0.037) (0.028) (0.005)(0.026) (0.021)
*
W/Y 0.0310.003 —0.109 0.030 0.056 (0.020) 0.014—0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.044)(0.007) (0.008) (0.007)(0.008) (0.006)
£n(Y*) 0.7260.0780.099 0.338 0.566 0.132 0.353 0.587
(0.118) (0.121) (0.100)(0.245) (0.152) (0.197)(0.138) (0.119)
Marginal2.0913.100 —0.121 3.230 2.663 0.969 1.296 0.013
Tax Rate (0.482) (0.470) (1.515)(0.927) (0.554) (0.459) (0.609) (0.470)
Age < 40 —0.6360.442 —0.088 —0.259—0.306 —0.167 —0.154 0.270
(0.076) (0.072) (0.266)(0.147) (0.082) (0.116) (0.100) (0.007)
Earnings0.6360.8781.592 1.784 1.086 0.404 —0.059—0.914
< 6000 (0.173) (0.178) (2.507)(0.357) (0.211) (0.286)(0.209) (0.168)
Education 0.1150.4730.494 0.632 0.700 0.426 0.424 0.226
(0.078) (0.082) (0.182)(0.196) (0.103) (0.144)(0.092) (0.075)
Number
Above 1771 797 3060 94 517 134 2745 2417
Number
Below 1313 2287 24 2990 2467 2950 339 667
309.5 68.7 16.1 91.2 309.5 34.2 444.5 230.7
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)— 13—
Permanentincome has a significant positive effect on the discrete
choice to hold particular assets. Similarly, education exerts a positive
impact on asset holdings. Low age exhibits a negative effect except on
holdings of savings bonds. Low household earnings, ceteris paribus,
have negative influence.
Table II contains the estimated coefficients for the basic asset
demand equations. The ratio of net worth (marketable wealth) to
permanent income exerts a depressing effect across the nnu of assets.
The coefficient on (the log of) permanent income is frequently not
significantly different from zero. In general, the relative share
demand for financial assets has a negative income elasticity and a
positive elasticity for nonfinancial assets.— 14—
TABLEII
Asset Demand Equations
Dependent Variable: 2.n(a/(1 —
ValueSavings Passenger
of Home BondsDepositsBondsEquityAnnuitiesCars Debt
Constant7.419 —2.111 —2.857 —9.697 4.642 0.810 —0.947—2.266
(1.612) (3.097) (1.153)(6.801) (5.069) (9.837)(1.005) (1.589)
*
PPW/Y —0.0004 0.013 —0.002 —0.163—0.017 —0.162 0.004 0.014
(0.004) (0.028) (0.002)(0.298) (0.072) (0.101)(0.002) (0.002)
*
SSW/Y —0.0580.0360.002 0.366—0.203 —0.297 0.022 0.007
(0.028) (0.017) (0.001)(0.116) (0.072) (0.149)(0.006) (0.001)
*
W/Y —0.099 —0.108 —0.043 —0.044—0.060 —0.043 —0.018—0.159
(0.008) (0.026) (0.008) (0.022 (0.019) (0.054)(0.008) (0.013)
£n(Y*)—0.628 —0.226 —0.082 —0.872—0.564 —0.373 —0.033 0.064
(0.136) (0.269) (0.116)(0.679) (0.442) (0.698)(0.101) (0.153)
Marginal0.1800.677 —0.055 —0.705 0.503 3.934 —0.112 0.655
Tax Rate (0.060) (0.974) (0.363)(1.861) (0.241) (2.001)(0.301) (0.269)
Self — —0.311—0.421 —0.131 —0.355—0.195 —0.166 —0.284 0.168
Employed (0.084) (0.248) (0.127)(0.595) (0.310)(0.570)(0.104) (0.142)
Farm 0.165 —0.895 —0.059 —2.323—1.212 0.285 —0.920—0.415
Family (0.191) (0.693) (0.287)(1.129) (0.600) (1.008)(0.241) (0.333)
Unem— —0.078 1.0630.311 —0.792 0.164 —0.731 —0.399—0.038
ployed (0.084) (0.265) (0.112)(0.603) (0.373) (0.641)(0.092) (0.139)
Number of 0.106 —0.194 —0.169 —0.284—0.093 —0.091 0.055 0.114
Kids < 18 (0.021) (0.059) (0.030)(0.121) (0.090) (0.161)(0.025) (0.034)
AGE 2 —0.185 —0.0140.339 —0.623 0.150 0.060 —0.152—0.759
(0.102) (0.159) (0.089)(0.500) (0.061) (0.515)(0.069) (0.103)
AGE 3 —0.192 —0.0090.813 0.017 0.289 —0.265 -0.265—1.573
(0.123) (0.085) (0.120)(0.648) (0.133) (0.605)(0.095) (0.149)
Inverse of
Mill's —0.734 —0.016 —10.304 —0.363—0.891 0.370 0.409—0.104
Ratio (0.321) (0.453) (5.284)(0.572) (0.441) (1.618)(0.170) (0.415)
Number with
Positive
Holdings 1771 797 3060 94 517 134 2745 2417
0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.20 0.35 0.32
24.59 8.78 34.99 2.43 2.75 2.56 48.54 34.66
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)— 15—
Anincrease in the marginal tax rate, ceteris paribus, raises
holdings of housing, equities, annuities, and debt relative to net
worth; negative effects occur for deposits, bonds, and vehicles. Only
the former category of estimated impacts is pronounced and statistically
significant, however. Feldstein's [10] finding that, under the special
features of the U.S. tax system, higher marginal tax rates raise the
relative demand for equities is borne Out. The results in Table III are
conditional on the household's holding the particular assets in
question. Insofar as changes in the marginal tax rate affect the
discrete choice of which assets to hold, the estimated coefficients in
Table II are underestimates of the impact of personal taxation on
portfolio composition.
Coefficient estimates for variables representing individual
characteristics are statistically significant at the 95 percent
confidence level. Self—employed individuals and farmers, ceteris
paribus, hold less of their wealth in financial assets than do the rest
of the sample. Larger families hold more of their wealth in housing and
cars and are more highly levered. Relative shares of financial assets
increase with age (with the exception of U. S. savings bonds), while
relative positions in physical assets decline with age. Leverage also
declines with age.
The estimated initial impact of the social security variable (ratio
of present value of anticipated benefits to net worth) on portfolio
composition can be found in the third row of Table II. All of the
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 95—percent
confidence level, with negative effects noted for housing, equities, and
annuities. Those effects are intuitive, in the first two cases because
of the "inflation hedge" properties of the assets and in the last
because compulsory purchases of social security annuities are a— 16—
substitutefor market—provided annuities. Positive effects are observed
for savings bonds, deposits, bonds, and vehicles; unlike indexed social
security benefits, bonds and deposits represent nominal claims. Also of
interest is the positive coefficient on SSW/W in the liabilities
regression, indicating that an increase in social security wealth
relative to marketable wealth increases leverage, a finding consistent
with agents' trying to "undo" the nonmarketability of anticipated future
social security benefits.
Results for the "composition effect" of private pension wealth (the
PPW/W variable) are not conclusive, with statistically significant
coefficients only for passenger cars and for liabilities. Much of the
ambiguity probably stems from the fact that, unlike social security,
private pension participation is not truly exogenous to individual
decisions. Moreover, there is no information in the data on the
portfolio composition of pension assets; hence no test can be made of
whether households "internalize" the portfolios of their pension funds.
Whether or not to use the same real discount rate for all
individuals in computing social security wealth or private pension
wealth is a difficult question. Older individuals may be more certain
of receiving anticipated pension benefits and may have a lower implicit
discount rate. To allow for differences in discount rates, the products
of the age brackets and the pension wealth variables were added to the
regression model in (14).
Table III reports the regression results when the age—pension
interaction terms are included. This attempt to capture age—specific
characteristics of the pension wealth variables did not produce
significantly different results for the marginal tax rate, the scale
variables, the composition variables, or the individual
characteristics. In most cases, the coefficients of the interaction— 17—
TABLEIII
Asset Demand Equations
Dependent Variable: £n(c/(1 —
ValueSavings Passenger
of Home BondsDepositsBondsEquityAnnuitiesCars Debt
Constant7.524 —2.054 —2.373 —6.799 5.215 —1.478 —0.990—1.942
(1.617) (3.412) (1.158)(9.007) (5.105)(9.107)(1.008) (1.581)
PPW/W —0.0010.011 —0.003 —0.310 0.131 —0.212 0.005 0.012
(0.005) (0.026) (0.003)(0.342) (0.112)(0.114)(0.002) (0.003)
SSw/w —0.0600.0340.002 0.356—0.211 0.785 0.020 0.006
(0.028) (0.018) (0.001)(0.122) (0.096)(0.512)(0.006) (0.001)
*
WIY —0.100 —0.104 —0.041 —0.041 —0.065 —0.061 —0.018—0.154
(0.008) (0.030) (0.008)(0.020) (0.020) (0.050)(0.009) (0.013)
£n(Y*)—0.636 —0.241 —0.001 0.637—0.612 —0.355 -0.029 0.031
(0.136) (0.270) (0.116)(0.804) (0.443) (0.636)(0.101) (0.152)
Marginal —0.1620.6490.114 —0.845 0.480 4.540 —0.112 0.622
Tax Rate (0.080) (0.984) (0.365)(2.413) (0.235) (1.927)(0.302) (0.266)
Self — —0.312—0.431 —0.132 —0.567—0.228 —0.084 —0.285 0.178
Employed (0.085) (0.237) (0.128)(0.656) (0.311) (0.527)(0.104) (0.141)
Farm 0.167 —0.912 —0.086 —1.755—1.165 0.191 —0.920 0.425
Family (0.191) (0.702) (0.288)(1.959) (0.607) (0.905)(0.241) (0.330)
Unem— —0.075 1.0590.310 0.879—0.184 —0.276 —0.394—0.087
ployed (0.085) (0.260) (0.112)(0.885) (0.371) (0.603)(0.093) (0.139)
Number of 0.106 —0.189 —0.174 —0.228—0.089 —0.065 0.055 0.107
Kids < 18 (0.021) (0.054) (0.030)(0.103) (0.096) (0.148)(0.025) (0.034)
AGE 2 —0.199 —0.0100.388 0.975 0.161 0.149 —0.150—0.825
(0.102) (0.170) (0.089)(0.894) (0.078) (0.735)(0.070) (0.106)
AGE 3 —0.199 —0.0100.988 0.009 0.426 1.595 —0.255—1.688
(0.126) (0.097) (0.116)(1.145) (0.205) (0.880)(0.096) (0.150)
AGE 2 x 0.0120.0020.002 0.532 0.231 0.005 0.001 0.014
(SSw/w)(0.010) (0.004) (0.003)(1.370) (0.195) (0.592)(0.004) (0.005)
AGE 3 x—0.001 0.0140.028 0.444—0.156 —2.001 —0.006 0.045
(SSw/w)(0.019 (0.007) (0.007)(1.513) (0.164) (0.631)(0.007) (0.011)
AGE 2 x —0.0090.0020.011 0.247—0.263 0.614 —0.007 0.009
(PPw/w)(0.009) (0.005) (0.007)(0.693) (0.146) (0.543)(0.007) (0.009)
AGE 3 x 0.0070.008 —0.044 1.057—0.449 0.456 0.008 0.042







Mill's —0.753 —0.020 —10.256 —0.050—0.964 0.740 0.415—0.305
Ratio (0.322) (0.450) (5.309)(0.661) (0.450) (1.480)(0.170) (0.416)
0.22 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.33
F 20.2 8.49 29.4 2.74 2.88 3.03 40.80 30.88
(Standard errors are in parentheses.)— 19—
termswere not significantly different from zero at the 95 percent
confidence level. A marked exception is total liabilities, where the
impact of social security wealth on leverage increases with age.'2
To provide a meaningful interpretation of the point estimates of
the impact of social security on portfolio allocation, the implied asset
(share) demand elasticities with respect to changes in SSW/W are
presented in Table IV. While the original coefficient estimates are
precisely measured, the elasticities are small absolutely. However, the
general equilibrium impact on portfolio allocation of a legislated
change in social security wealth depends on the change in desired asset
shares, the response of the level of marketable wealth (saving effect),
and on any formal integration with private pension systems. Only the
first of those effects has been examined thus far.
TABLE IV
POINT ELASTICITIESOF RELATIVE SHAREDEMAND
WITH RESPECT W SSW/W
Assets Elasticity
Value of Home —0.03







III.ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF A ChANGE IN SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS
The estimation results in the previous section can be used to
identify the immediate impact on household portfolio allocation of a
change in social security benefits relative to earnings. Those measures
are necessary but not sufficient for an analysis of the effects on
wealth allocation of a change in social security wealth; changes in
social security will affect non—pension wealth accumulation and private
pension benefits.
Consider first the wealth accumulation process. Suppose that
social security wealth and private pension wealth are among the
determinants of an investor's desired wealth; moreover, let them be
exogenous to that decision.'3 While individuals are assumed to take
private pension wealth as given, the integration of some pension plans
with the social security system means that social security wealth will
still influence private pension accumulation.
Let the ratio of non—pension wealth to permanent income for
individual i in period t be determined according to:
W ' SSW PPW =a+a —a(_—-)i
—a(_—-)i, (16)
*
whereW, Y ,D,SSW, and PPW denote wealth, permanent income, a vector
of individual characteristics, and the present values of social security
and private pension benefits, respectively. While the amount of "social
security saving" is fixed by law, pension saving is assumed adjust to
social security changes, so that
=b÷ b'D.t —b(--)i. (17)— 21—
Combiningequations (16) and (17) yields
=(a—ab)+(a'—ab')D.—(a—ab)(.-)1. (18)
Suppose, for example, that Congress legislated a benefit increase
sufficient to raise SSWIY* bypercent. From equation (18), the offset




increase in social security social security
SSW offset to wealth offset to private
pension wealth
Hence, ascertaining the general equilibrium impact on asset shares of a
change in social security wealth requires knowledge not only of the
parameters of the basic model, but also of the offset parameters a,a,
and
In another paper using the same data (Hubbard, 1983), I estimated
the offsets (evaluated at sample means) to non—pension net worth from an
extra dollar of social security wealth and from an extra dollar to
private pension wealth to be thirty—three cents and sixteen cents,
respectively.'5 Given the information available in the data set, it is
not possible to determine the reduction in private pension benefits
attendant to a permanent increase in social security benefits.
Calculations of the general equilibrium impact on portfolio composition
of a permanent change in social security benefits are performed under— 22—
threevalues for b5 —zero,thirty—three cents, and fifty cents. Table
V contains the analogues of the elasticities reported in Table IV after
adjustments in net worth and private pension benefits have taken place.
Comparing the elasticity measures in Table V with those of Table
IV, the importance of considering the linkages among social security,
private pension, and fungible net worth is readily apparent. The
reductions in net worth and in private pension benefits from an increase
in social security benefits alter the ultimate impact of the pension
benefit change on portfolio composition. The general equilibrium
elasticities are larger than the original impact elasticities. Given
the small offset the net worth of private pension wealth, the results
are not highly sensitive to the choice of the (assumed) offset to
private pension benefits of a change in social security benefits.16
The structure of and dynamics of the portfolio adjustment process
are also important. This paper has only looked at desired asset shares;
the empirical work has implicitly assumed individuals can and do
reshuffle their portfolios to quickly balance desired and actual wealth
allocation. Much of the recent work on portfolio adjustment processes
has focused on the allocation problem in the presence of changes in new
investable funds.17 To be appropriate for the problem at hand, such a
model must address the impact of changes in mandated asset holdings
(like social security wealth). Adding that dimension represents an
important extension of the analysis in the paper.18 At that stage, more
reasonable policy simulations could be designed to evaluate the dynamics
of the effects of shfits in the structure of the social security system
on household wealth accumulation and allocation.— 23—
TABLEV
General Equilibrium Elasticities of Relative
ShareDemands with Respect to SSW/W
Asset Elasticity
bgp =0.00bgp =0.33bgp =0.50
Value of Home —0.05 —0.05 —0.04
U. S. Savings Bonds 0.06 0.05 0.05
Deposits 0.02 0.02 0.01
Bonds 0.28 0.26 0.25
Equities —0.20 —0.19 —0.18
Annuities —0.28 —0.26 —0.25
Passenger Cars 0.10 0.09 0.08
Debt 0.03 0.03 0.03— 24—
IV.CONCLUSIONS
Concentrating onsocialsecurity as an annuity, this paper
considers the impact of social security on asset markets, through its
effects on household wealth allocation. Existing optimizing models of
wealth allocation are extended to include the constraint of manadatory
participation in the social security system. Results for the impact of
social security on portfolio choice and composition depend on household
holdings of social security annuities relative to non—pension wealth and
on the correlations of the return on social security with those on
marketable assets.
Section II tests the influence of social security wealth on
portfolio composition using the model outlined in the text and cross—
section data collected under the auspices of the U. S. President's
Commission on Pension Policy. Estimation of the model gives interesting
results for the effects of marginal tax rates and of social security
holdings. Effects of the marginal tax rate generally are particularly
strong for housing, equities, annuities, and total liabilities. Changes
in social security benefits exhibit significant partial equilibrium
impacts on portfolio composition. Negative effects are noted for
housing, equities, and annuities; positive effects are observed for
saving bonds, deposits, bonds, and vehicles. Also of interest is the
positive impact of social security on liabilities, indicating that a
permanent increase in social security benefits relative to non—pension
wealth increases leverage. The general equilibrium impact on portfolio
allocation of a legislated change in social security depends not only on
the change in desired asset shares, but also on the response of the
level of marketable wealth (saving effect) and on any formal integration
with private pension systems.— 25—
Thethird section develops more fully those general equilibrium
qualifications to the regression results in section II by considering
the response of non—pension wealth accumulation to changes in pension
wealth. Specifically, a permanent increase in the present value of
anticipated social security benefits of $1.00 reduces non—pension wealth
by thirty—three cents. Using this estimate in conjunction with
assumptions about evidence on the impact of the social security system
on other forms of retirement saving, the results in section II are
augmented to evaluate the general equilibrium effects on portfolIo
allocation of changes in social security wealth. In many cases, those
effects are much large than the partial equilibrium effects.
Two other extensions readily suggest themselves. What are the
dynamics of the accumulation and allocation of marketable wealth in
response to changes in pension wealth? Second, how will the impacts of
the social security system on our variables of interest circumscribe the
impacts of changes in policy guiding the use of individual retirement
saving plans? While the controversy over the implictions of the social
security system for household saving is still unresolved, it is also
important to examine the program's direct effects on asset markets.
That analysis may shed light on the problem of ascertaining household
valuations of social security and on the ways in which agents attempt to
"undo" constraints on thier asset—holding behavior.— 26
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'In theory, the social security does not have to be unfair in order to
reduce household saving. Abel [1] and Hubbard [19] emphasize the
impact of social security on saving in the context of individual
uncertainty over longevity and find that even a fair social security
system can reduce household saving by more than the taxes paid.
2The effects of nonmarketable assets on portfolio structure have been
examined by Mayers in the context of the standard Capital Asset
Pricing Model of Sharpe [32] and Lintner [22]. Merton [27]
concentrates directly ant he nonmarketability of human capital and
shows that under certain conditions a tax and transfer system
similar to the current social security system can mimic the optimal
allocation path, reducing or eliminating the economic lneffciencies
stemming from the nonmarketability of human capital.
3The benefits of many private pension plans are formally integrated with
the social security system, reducing payments as social security
benefits are augmented. Savings models (as in Feldstein [11, 12])
or portfolio allocation models (as in Dicks—Mireaux and King [7])
which include as explanatory variables both private pension and
social security annuities should consider not only their offset to
non—pension wealth, but also the offset to private pension saving
attendant to increases in social security benefits.
4As noted in Merton [26] and in Friedman and Roley [15], those
properties (linearity in expected returns and wealth homogeneity)
can be derived from a general expected utility maximization in
continuous time under the assumptions of (1) constant relative risk
aversion and (ii) joint normally distributed expected asset
returns. Empirical evidence in support of the first assumption can
be found in Friend and Blume [16].
5The matrix A is symmetric with non—negative main diagonal elements.
Moreover, the sum of the elements of each individual column of A is
zero. For more details, see Roley [30] or Hubbard [19].
similar point surfaces in deciding whether to aggregate human wealth
and social security wealth. The lack of a proportional relationship
between the two major nonmarketable assets suggests that they should
be kept separate in any empirical analysis. Above a certain level
of (permanent) wage income, increases in human wealth will not be— 27—
followedby increases in social security wealth. Earlier tests of
the influence on portfolio allocation of nonmarketable assets (such
as those of Mayers [24] or Friend and Blume [16]) focused on human
capital. Lumping social security wealth together with human wealth
may be further questionable because their risk characteristics are
not the same. At a minimum, cyclical fluctuations in real wages and
the lack of complete price—level indexation of wages make human
wealth riskier than social security. (There is also an age
heterogeneity effect when considering social security because of the
liability represented by future social security tax payments.)
Friend and Blume [16, p. 914] made a similar point by concluding
that if the return on social security were uncorrelated with the
return on the portfolio of marketable risky assets then the
inclusion of social security wealth in human wealth would decrease
the value of a now more broadly defined "beta coefficient" of human
wealth.
70f course, under this transformation, the adding—up requirements no
longer hold.
8See Feenberg [9] for a description of the TAXSIM model. With only one
cross—section of units, it is impossible to consider the impacts of
variables which are the same across units (such as the return on a
particular assets, the rate of inflation, etc.). Marginal tax rates
do vary across units. Of course, the problem of endogeneity of the
marginal tax rate with respect to portfolio composition still
remains.
9lndividual characteristics can be important factors fri the
determination of how wealth is allocated. Families with many
children may have larger houses; self—employed individuals may have
more of their wealth in business equity, etc.
'°Heckman's mothod [18] does not yield consistent standard errors, and,
moreover, as Greene [17] points out, it is impossible to state
whether the reported "conventional" standard error is a lower bound
or an upper bound of the "true" standard error.
''The category "deposits" includes deposits with financial
institutions. Unfortunately, "bonds' in the data set comprise both
those whose interest payments are subject to taxation and those
whose interest payments are not. "Equity" is the sum of direct
holdings and mutual fund shares. All assets are at market value.
Other asset categories like business equity, money market funds, and
notes and mortgages held had too few observations to ascertain
meaningful results.
could reflect greater certainty over receipt of anticipated
social security benefits. While it is illegal to borrow against
social security benefits per Se, older individuals may take
anticipated benefits into account borrowing against their other
assets.— 28—
13Exogeneityis more obvious for social security wealth than for private
pension wealth. Some individuals (certainly those with defined
contribution plans) have control over their employee pension saving.
see this, note that
SSW dSSW ssw d(—) = (1+ (a —ab)(—) and w w spsp
PPW dSSW PPW d(—) C—b+ (a —ab w w sp 5
Only if b5 a5/a will dSSW/W be equal to d(SSW/W).
15See Hubbard [19] for the background of the wealth accumulation model
and for the estimation procedure. More specifically, the offsets
were estimated from the ratios of the pension wealth variables to
permanent income to the ratio of net worth to permanent income.
16A possible extension would be to obtain a more informed estimate based
on an examination of a cross—section of private pension plans.
'7See, for example, the survey in Friedman [14] and his development of
the "optimal marginal adjustment model," which distinguishes between
the allocation of new investable funds and the reallocation of
existing wealth.
18That extension was not pursued here because of the dubious quality of
the second wave of data in the survey.— 29—
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APPENDIX
Constructing a Proxy for Permanent Income
The concept of permanent income (or normal annual earnings) is
important both for wealth accumulation (because of the age profile of
the ratio of net worth to permanent income implied by the life—cycle
model) and for portfolio allocation (because of its connection with the
normal level of transactions). Permanent income is not an observable
variable, so that some sort of estimation procedure is needed to obtain
a proxy based on (observable) current earnings.
Let the model for determining permanent income be such that
(Al) in (*) x i3 + S.
th
Where X1 is a vector of observable variables for the Iindividual,
is the associated parameter vector, and Si measures luck or skill,
where S1 has mean zero and variance o. In a given year, earnings
will differ from permanent income because of one's position in the age—
earnings profile and because of transitory earnings. Letting Z1 denote
th
earnings in period t by the iindividual,
(A2) in (Z.) —in(*) + f(A.) +
where A represents age and €ft represents the transitory portion of
earnings (with mean zero and variance o).By assumption, S
and are uncorreiated. The combination of (Al) and (A2) yields the
following earnings function:- A2
(A3) in (Z.) X. + f(A.) + S. +
An estimate of permanent income for each individual in the sampie
can be constructed from the estimate ,ifwe can inpute a value of
S1. Given the residual from the earnings equation (S. + the
minimum—variance estimator S.(given S1 + €j)itjust:
2
(A4) =
2 2 (S. ÷
From (Al), (A2), and (A4), the estimate of permanent income is
(A5) in (y*) = + f(A. ) + s•
*
1 1 it 1
Separate earnings equations were estimated f,r male heads of
households and for wives; households headed by a woman were deleted from
the sample. A significant portion of the individual (almost twenty—five
percent) had current earnings of less than $2500, probably in part
because of part—time work. The model is designed to predict earnings of
"full—time" employees, so the sample was truncated at earnings of
$2500. The resulting bias from selecting on the dependent variable was
corrected for using Heckman's (1979) two—stage procedure.**
*Because only a single crosssection of data is used, it is not possible
to obtain estimates of o and o in addition to .Itis necessary
to assume a value for asAc + o)based on a study of longitudinal
earnings data. Following the survey of such studies in King and Dicks—
reaux (1982), I assumed that 0I (o + a) =0.5.
The drill is the same as in the asset demand case in the text. In the
first stage, a probit analysis of the full sample yields the parameters
of the probability that an individual will be in the truncated sample.
The second stage is to estimate the earnings function by ordinary least
squares with the addition of the universe of Mill's ratio (computed for
each observation in the truncated sample) as an explanatory variable.-A3 -
Theprobit model for men includes as explanatory variables youth,
old age, low education, marriage, part—time work, and unemployment. The
women's probit model was identical to that for men with addition of
number of children under two, the number of children between two and
five, and the number of children between five and twelve as explanatory
variables. Regressions included as independent variables occupational
dummies, a cubic polynomial in variables. Regressions included as
independent variables occupational dummies, a cubic polynomal in
variables. Regressions included as independent variables occupational
dummies, a cubic polynomial in age, race (white versus nonwhite),
education levels, self—employment status, martial status, and the
inverse of the Mill's ratio from the probit analysis.
Details of the maximum—likelihood estimates of the probit model for
earnings of less than $2500 or of the second stage estimates of the
earnings equation are available on request. Total household permanent
income is the same as the estimates for husbands and for wives.
Computation of the Pension Wealth Variables
Gross social security wealth is computed according to the following
procedures. The Social Security Administration (SSA) was able to match
5516 repondents with social security records. On the basis of an
assumption of two percent future growth of real wages and given the law
in 1979, statisticians of the SSA calculated the projected Primary
Insurance Amount (PIA) for age 65 for the non—retired. For those
retired, the actual PIA was directly available. In computing the
present values, a real discount rate of three percent was used,with
average inflation projected to be four percent. Standard mortality- A4
assumptions were used in the present value calculation. The household's
social security wealth is the sum of the husband's and the wife's social
security wealth. Results were not very sensitive to changes in
assumptions.
Present values were also computed for private pension benefits.
Attempts were made to calculate the present value of pension benefits
for all respondents who currently receive a pension, who currently
participate in a plan, or who are terminated with a vested benefit.
When information was available, the present value of all pension
benefits accrued to date was calculated from the respondent's
questionnaire, the EBS—1 forms, and the employer questionnaire. In the
calculations used in the paper, a real discount rate of three percent
was used in conjunction with a four percent inflation rate. Again,
standard mortality assumptions were used.